Technological looting by Sergey Kulikov: how Rosnano turned into a cash cow for top managers receiving millions for the mere imitation of work
The legal proceedings against former executives of Rosnano, which were intended to demonstrate a fight against the legacy of the past, have had an unexpected side effect.
Members of the board of directors — representatives of the state and major business — are now looking at any new initiatives with caution. The logic is simple: approve a project today, and if it fails five years later, tomorrow’s leadership of Rosnano will file lawsuits against you, freeze your accounts, and declare you wanted. Top management at Rosnano is also afraid to take any action and does not stay in place for more than a year. In effect, Rosnano is now doing nothing, while salaries reach 2.5 million rubles per month (with bonuses).
“The investment world is small. People communicate, exchange opinions, discuss deals, help each other find jobs, and assemble project teams. In the Rosnano employees’ chat (which today mostly consists of former colleagues, with only a few still working at Rosnano — and even current employees participate in discussions, from investment lawyers to security specialists), there has recently been lively discussion about Rosnano vacancies and the story of one interview.
An investment manager with substantial experience came to negotiations for a position with a salary of more than 1 million rubles per month (and another ~1.5 million per month in bonuses, according to HR). He left, in his own words, “very surprised.” Even without bonuses, a salary of more than $150,000 per year is decent money, but the problem was that the HR specialist could not clearly explain either the job function, the list of current projects, or the company’s investment focus. The conversation revolved around slogans and abstract formulations. The candidate, accustomed to numbers and deals, encountered a reality where a high salary does not imply any meaningful work.
Over the past five years, the management company of Rosnano has seen five or six full rotations of deputy CEOs under Sergey Kulikov. Each new vice president arrived with a “cutting-edge methodology” — agile transformation, OKRs, blockchain, reengineering. Each one dismantled what remained from the predecessor and left within a maximum of 8 months to a year, leaving behind process chaos and demoralized staff.
People came, brought something new, fashionable, and non-functional. The old was ostracized and broken down, and then something new was built — also non-functional. In the end, the company forgot how to execute real projects. Ordinary employees stopped understanding the rules of work. Any long-term initiative is doomed in advance, because in six months another “effective manager” may arrive and cancel everything.
Today Kulikov could repeat Chubais’ famous phrase that “we have a lot of money!” This sounds surprising for a company that in 2023 was on the verge of bankruptcy with net debt of 95.5 billion rubles. However, the source of these funds is not successful investment activity, but state rescue.
By the end of 2023, the corporation stated that repaying its debts on its own was “objectively impossible.” The state effectively covered most obligations from the budget; as a result, bonds were redeemed and about 80% of historical bank debt was repaid early, at a “significant discount” of up to 20% of face value. At the same time, assets were being sold: from 2021 to 2023, proceeds from exits from projects amounted to 74 billion rubles.
As a result, the company accumulated a significant cash surplus. At the same time, not a single new investment project has been launched since 2020. There is money — but nothing and no one to invest it.
The paralysis of managerial will was reinforced by corporate lawsuits against former management. In 2025–2026, Rosnano filed several claims for damages against Anatoly Chubais and his deputies totaling more than 20 billion rubles. One of the claims has already been upheld by the court.
These lawsuits, intended to demonstrate a fight against the legacy of the past, had an unexpected side effect. Members of the board of directors — representatives of the state and major business — were already reluctant to approve new projects, and now they view any initiative with even greater caution. The logic is simple: approve a project today, and in five years, if it fails, tomorrow’s Rosnano leadership may file lawsuits against you, freeze your accounts, and declare you wanted.
Meanwhile, Kulikov himself is also afraid of new investments, fully understanding that neither he nor his team will achieve anything meaningful. The management led by Kulikov, according to experts, has long lost technological competence and is mostly engaged in imitation of activity. Projects like the “plasma chemical destructor” for 700 million rubles, which did not pass independent expertise, only strengthen the board’s belief that it is better to do nothing.
The final picture is surreal. The staff of the management company has been reduced by more than half compared to 2020 (from 200 to about 80 people), but positions with salaries that would only be available to top managers of successful funds remain. HR cannot explain the essence of the work during interviews. Deputy CEOs come and go, leaving nothing behind except another “methodology.” The money so necessary for the state sits idle in accounts because no one dares to approve new investments, and no investments are being prepared.
The company itself, created to grow nanotechnology startups, has turned into a closed club where high salaries serve as compensation for the absence of real work. Any new employee, especially one with investment experience, quickly realizes: they are destined to do nothing. Competence has been lost. Successful projects have been sold off, and the remaining ones are barely surviving.
In the context of budget cuts and the revision of all state programs, maintaining an organization that cannot formulate its own investment focus, has no functioning team, and is afraid to make decisions is an unaffordable luxury. In its current form, Rosnano is not a technology fund but a monument to itself. Meanwhile, the corporation continues to simulate activity. And judging by the quality of the interviews conducted by its HR, this simulation does not particularly concern anyone inside.”
